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Abstract 
 
We specify a VEC model based on six main macroeconomic 
imbalances to explain the Great European Recession, in Germany, 
France, Spain and Italy, from 1999 to 2013, estimating their long-
term relationships. We focus on employment and unemployment as 
the main imbalances and identify consumption and investment 
slumps, prompted by fiscal consolidation, as the causes and current 
account rebalance and low inflation as the main consequences. Our 
main results are the following: a) public investment is the main 
policy instrument which can foster employment, prompting private 
investment and growth, exports can only partly balance a falling 
domestic demand; b) the unemployment-current account trade-off is 
a structural constraint to a lower unemployment level; c) mild 
deflation set in as a consequence of the consumption slump and oil 
price decline; d) breaks dates for consumption and inflation 
thresholds are estimated; and e) Germany successfully passed 
through the European recession by sharply increasing its exports and 
reshaping its economic role. 

JEL Classifications: E21, E22, E24, E31, F32, F45, O52 
Keywords: Europe, employment, unemployment, consumption, 
investment, current account, inflation.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Unlike the U.S. Great Recession that began in 2008, Europe went 
through a second recession in 2012-2013 stemming from the 
sovereign debt crisis: public debt, as a ratio to GDP, has steadily 
increased since 2008 as consequence of slowing or declining GDP.  
The timing of the fiscal consolidation, implemented to reduce the 
public debt/GDP ratio, has been increasingly questioned: the issue is 
whether public debt reduction pursued with austerity measures can 
promote economic growth or, vice versa, whether an expansionary 
fiscal policy in a depressed economy could be self-financing, 
promoting economic growth and public debt reduction (De Long and 
Summers (2012). The implementation of the first policy option, after 
two years of recession and an increasing public debt to GDP ratio, 
has cast serious doubts on its effectiveness, prompting a more careful 
analysis of the second option, at which our paper is aimed.  
The economic debate has been primarily focused on the value of 
the fiscal multiplier: as Ramey’s survey (2011) shows, its value for a 
temporary, deficit financed increase, the type of stimulus package 
adopted in the US, has a wide range of estimates, from 0.8 to 1.5. 
Moreover, a single multiplier is a weighted average between a period 
of expansion and recession, with the further constraint that deep 
recessions are few, with nonlinearities hard to estimate (Parker, 
2011). Blanchard and Leigh (2011,2013) find a negative relationship 
between growth forecast errors and planned fiscal consolidations 
during the crisis, mainly in Europe, implying a higher than expected 
fiscal multiplier. They note that the “forecaster significantly 
underestimated the increase in unemployment and the decline in 
private consumption and investment”, with the consequence that 
consumption came to depend much more on current rather than 
future income, while investment depended more on current rather 
than future profits. Problems of nonlinearity of impulse responses 
have been addressed with an econometric procedure proposed by 
Jordà (2005) on episodes of prolonged recessions: empirical results 
imply medium-term multipliers, over five years, of -2 for output, -3 
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for employment and 1,5 for unemployment (Dell’Erba, Koloskova, 
Poplawski-Ribeiro, 2014).  
In Europe, the economic debate is more focused on the value of 
the “output gap”, which is the difference between the potential 
output and the effective output: the “output gap” is the cornerstone 
on which the cyclical adjusted budget is measured and the national 
fiscal policies are approved and implemented. A crucial intermediate 
step is the estimate of the NAWRU (Non-accelerating wage rate of 
unemployment), a concept related to the NAIRU (Non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment) from which an equilibrium 
unemployment rate can be derived, to map the labour force in 
potential employment and potential output (Havick et al., 2014). 
This paper argues instead that economic policy should be focused 
on filling the “Investment Gap”, defined as the gap of investments 
necessary to increase employment and reduce unemployment at the 
pre-crisis levels: investments are also the carrier of innovation, 
increasing productivity and better standards of living. 
These different strands of research converge when looking to the 
impact of government expenditures on the employment/unemployment 
relationship. A positive and significant relationship is estimated in 
the US, where it is estimated that an increase of government 
spending of 1 percent of GDP prompts an employment multiplier of 
approximately 1,5 at its peak. Interestingly, the authors find that their 
results hold when complementarity between consumption and 
employment is coupled with price stickiness (Monacelli, Perotti, 
Trigari, 2010). In the US, the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) of 2009, focused heavily on infrastructure spending and 
fiscal aid to state governments, allowed a more careful analysis of 
the positive impact of stimulus funds, estimated at $125.000 per job 
(Wilson, 2012). 
In Europe, the research pattern is similar, coupling fiscal 
consolidation with its effects on employment (Escudero and Mourelo, 
2014), as well as a straightforward approach to the relationship 
between investment and growth (DIW Economic Bulletin, 2014) and 
public investment and growth, through the stimulus to the domestic 
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demand and the spillover on other European countries (Elekdag and 
Muir, 2014). 
The paper is focused on unemployment and employment as the 
primary social goals, whose improvement is required for a 
generalized economic recovery in Europe: we unbundle the main 
causes and consequences of the Great European Recession to provide 
a framework for our economic policy implications. 
The plan for our paper is the following. Section 2 presents 
stylized facts about the European crisis and a description of the data 
used for the econometric estimates, section 3 details the model 
specification, and section 4 covers, in three sub-sections, the 
suggested interpretation for the Great European Recession and the 
related policy implications. Section 4.1 analyses policy implications, 
namely the investment-employment and unemployment relationships, 
section 4.2 identifies the consumption and investment slumps as the 
main causes of the recession, when and why structural breaks 
occurred, and section 4.3 analyses the consequences: the sharp 
inflation drop, the unemployment-current account relationship, and 
the role of Germany and of its success through the second European 
recession (Burda et al. 2011; Dustman et al. 2014). 
 
 
2. Stylized Facts and Data Description 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis, following the US crisis of 2008, 
prompted a second recession in the European Southern countries: the 
main consequence has been a sudden stop of the economic 
convergence between European countries. The bigger countries with 
a significant GDP loss, between 2000 and 2013, were Italy and Spain, 
and, among the smaller countries, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus. 
Around one third of the EU population lost a sizable volume of GDP. 
Germany was the country with the biggest GDP improvement, 
together with the U.K. and France (Table A.2).  
The GDP divergence was mirrored by an increasing gap between 
countries whose unemployment rates rose sharply, such as Spain, 
Italy, Greece, and Portugal, and countries where the unemployment 
rate remained at a low level or even declined, such as Germany, 
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Austria, and Luxembourg. The unemployment rate in France 
increased only slightly, but at a rather high level. As a consequence, 
between 2008 and 2014, the simple standard deviation of the 
unemployment rates inside the European Union (28) tripled, while 
the weighted standard deviation quadrupled.  
The increasing economic and financial interconnectedness 
between European countries, a primary achievement of the normal 
times, has been the root of the European economic divide as well as 
of the contagion and systemic instability in the countries more 
severely hit. The degree of resilience of some countries is now the 
most serious issue for the EU because of the impending slow growth, 
or even stagnation: the basic question is how long it will take to 
regain pre-crisis levels. The normal business-cycle pattern after WW 
II – long sustained growth and short recession – has been overturned 
by a long period of recession and a slow recovery. The case of Italy 
(figure 1) exemplifies a problem common to other countries. 
The double-dip recession, in 2009 and 2011-2014, reduced by 15 
years the levels of domestic consumption and investment: as 
suggested by figure 1, export increases were not sufficient to balance 
the reduction in domestic consumption. The long period of steady 
investment decline may have reduced the potential output and the 
prospects of a rapid unemployment reduction. The crucial question is 
therefore how long it will take, in Italy and other countries, to return 
to pre-2008 economic levels, avoiding the trap of low growth.  
Overall, the investment volume for the EU (28) countries remained 
stable over the 2000-2013 period (-0.2%), going through an upswing of 
+20% from 2000 to 2008, and a sharp slowdown of -17% from 2008 to 
2013. The investment slump after 2008 was widespread in all European 
countries, with many countries cancelling out, partly or totally, the 
increase achieved from 2000 to 2008: France still ended up with a 
significant increase, Germany and U.K. returned to the same level of 
2000, while in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, investment fell 
significantly over the entire period. Poland was the only country where 
investment increased before and after the crisis.  
The main economic consequence of the European recession was a 
sudden stop of the previous economic achievements in terms of 
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convergence, reflected in the prolonged economic slowdown for one 
third of the European population. The chain reaction of the crisis is 
not yet over and, since the end of 2014, has taken the form of a 
creeping risk of deflation.  
To analyse causes, consequences and economic policy 
implications of the European crisis, we selected four major European 
countries – Germany, Spain, France and Italy – which account for 
77% of the Euro Zone GDP and can represent the different 
behaviours and interactions within the Euro Zone before and after the 
2008 crisis. We chose to select six main variables, for which we had 
available homogenous series of quarterly data, from 1999q1 to 
2013q4, for each country: they are the main economic imbalances on 
which our analysis is based. Two of these imbalances are included in 
the scoreboard of the European Union Alert Mechanism. Data are 
from Eurostat, according to the ESA95 system of accounts: 
ESA2010 has been introduced at the end of 2014. Tables and figures 
including recent data for 2014 are, for homogeneity, from ESA2010. 
A detailed list and explanation of the variables is available in the 
Legend in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 1  
 

Source: our calculations on the Eurostat database 
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3. Model Specification 
To unbundle the inside mechanisms of the Great European Recession, 
we chose to focus on a subset of economic variables that measure the 
main economic imbalances brought about by the crisis: employment, 
unemployment, consumption, investments, current account and 
inflation. 
We posit a demand-driven casual chain: the drop of domestic 
final consumption drives the fall of investment, and as a consequence 
an increase in unemployment and a slowdown in employment. 
Furthermore, we track the chain of reactions on the current account 
balance and the falling inflation rates. Finally, we exploit the 
employment/unemployment relationship with investments and 
exports to analyse the main policy implications of our results.  
To model and check this casual chain, we proceed with a two-
level estimation strategy. First of all, we set up a basic Vector Error 
Correction Model, for each variables and each country, with the 
purpose of identifying the long-term elasticities for each relationship 
and comparing them between the four countries on the basis of the 
same specification. The investment equation was instead estimated 
with an OLS because no valid VECM specification could be 
identified: we will suggest an economic interpretation about this. 
Then, we proceed to an in-depth examination of two equations – 
consumption and inflation – to test their robustness. Inflation was 
also estimated with SUR to detect the economic interactions between 
the four countries and the role of domestic consumption on the 
inflation slowdown. We also tested the role of households saving for 
consumption with an OLS specification and both consumption and 
inflation were tested for breaks. 
The robustness of the parameter estimates over the entire period, 
1999-2013, is heavily influenced by the economic shock of 2008, 
while estimates over the period 2008-2013 are carried out with a 
smaller number of observations.  
For a neater presentation of the VEC specifications, we exclude 
lags, whose length is instead shown in each table with the summary 
estimates of the long-term elasticities: all variable are in log, thus 
measuring elasticities. With the exception of the investment equation, 
12 
estimated with OLS, the VEC specification is estimated with the 
Johansen procedure. The following equation numbering is organized 
to match the number of the corresponding tables, which summarize 
the long-term estimates, and to avoid cumbersome notation we use 
the same subscripts for each equation. Auxiliary specifications are in 
the Appendix. 
 
         !" # $" # $"%  & (1) 
  
E = Total Employment  
I = Fixed Investment  
X = Exports 
 
'         !'" # $" # $"%  &  (2) 
U=unemployment rate 
I = Fixed Investment 
X = Exports 
 
Both the equations (1) and (2) were also estimated distinguishing 
between public and private investments:  
 
  (  )*  )'   !" # $)*" # $)'"%  &
 (1.1) 
 
'    )*  )'   !'" # $)*" # $)'"%  &
 (2.1) 
 
PU=Public Fixed Investment  
PR= Private Fixed Investment 
 
+    ,  -.  /*  0-1+ 
 !+" # $," # $-2" # $/*" # $0-1"%  & (3) 
 
C=Final Consumption expenditures of households,  
Y= Gross Disposable Income of households,  
FW=Financial wealth,  
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R=Interest rate,  
FS=Fiscal stance (collective consumption/direct+indirect taxes) 
 
Consumption is further estimated, as an OLS, with the following 
specification: 
 
+   ," -." /*" 01*" & (3.1) 
 
SR=Saving rate 
 
    +"0    /)*  & (4) 
 
I=Investment,  
C=Consumption,  
X=Exports,  
PR=Profits 
 
+2    '  & (5) 
 
CA=Current Account (% GDP) 
U=Unemployment rate 
 
3    +  45   !3" # $+" # $45"%  & (6) 
 
 = Inflation (annual - yoy) 
C=Consumption 
OIL=Oil price (€) 
 
Inflation is also estimated with a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
for the four countries, with the following specification: 
 
3    3"  3"  /+("0  045("  6'("0  &  
 (6.1) 
 
For all the specifications, we assume that the error terms are 
&78!( 9:
%;  
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Lags lengths are selected on the basis of the Lag Length Criteria: 
if the cointegration test fails or the sign and size of the elasticities is 
theoretically incorrect, we use different lengths, but closer to the 
prevailing criteria. Tests for cointegration, heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation are carried out. Main estimates, specified above, are 
in the main text, and auxiliary estimates are in the Appendix (Table 
7.B). 
 
 
4. Empirical Results and Policy Implications 
4.1. Policy Implications 
Employment and unemployment are the main economic imbalances of 
the European Union, while investments and exports are the main drivers 
of lower unemployment and higher employment. However, while 
exports are an exogenous variable, the government, indirectly through 
fiscal policies or directly with higher public investments, can promote 
higher domestic investments. Investments are crucial for economic 
growth because, beyond their impact on unemployment and 
employment, they are carriers of technological innovation. From 2008 
to 2013, investments declined in Italy and Spain, remained stable in 
Germany and slightly decreased in France. In 2014, the investment 
growth turned positive in Germany and Spain, but remained negative in 
Italy and France. At the same time, export growth was higher in 
Germany and Spain than in France and Italy, and employment 
responded accordingly, with higher growth in Germany and Spain.   
4.1.1. Employment and the “Investment Gap” 
Full employment can be defined as the level of labour and capital for 
which the economy is on the frontier of its potential production 
function. To avoid uncertainty and shortcomings surrounding the 
measurement of potential output, we choose to take as a reference the 
pre-crisis level of employment. The relationship between 
employment, investments and exports is measured in terms of 
elasticities, which can easily be translated in terms of the investment 
15
multiplier as a measure of “how much employment has to be 
increased to yield an increase in real income sufficient to induce [the 
public] to do the necessary extra saving” (Keynes 1936, 117).  
The VEC estimates for the four countries over the entire period, 
using the same specification, are summarized in Table 1. We can 
check the results against the employment downfall during the crisis: 
from the peak, at the end of 2007, to the trough at the end of 2013, 
employment fell by 3,6 million in Spain (-17,4%), 1,2 million in 
Italy (-5%), and 0.4 million in France (-1%). On the basis of these 
estimates, we can conduct an economic policy exercise. 
 
Table 1 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log ( total employment ) = 0 + 1*log(total investment) + 2*log(export)    
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Total investment 0,304 0,578 0,296 0,409 
(5,69) (12,98) (6,80) (3,44) 
Export 0,126 0,124   0,182 
(2,69) (2,18)   (6,15) 
C 5,148 2,076 6,766 3,533 
        
Lags 2* 2** 2* 2** 
White Test prob 0,1571 0,0125 0,3976 0,2431 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 41,30 14,70 1,50 21,85 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 35,17 7,44 8,41 26,48 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T – trend added 
In Italy, a 10% investment increase implies a long-term increase of 
3% in employment (22 million), which corresponds to approximately 
660.000 employees; therefore, to recover the lost employment of 1,2 
million, an increase of +18% would be required. The investment 
required could be less if exports also increase: a 20% increase of 
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exports would imply a long-term 2.5% increase of employment 
(0.126*2), i.e., 550.000 jobs. A joint increase of 10% in investments 
and 20% in exports would still make up for the employment loss.  
The case of Germany is different because employment has 
steadily increased since 2005: employment rose from 36,4 million 
in 2005 to 39,5 in 2013, with an increase of 3,1 million, i.e., +8,7%; 
real investments rose +13,4% and export volumes +38,6% 
(ESA2010). The contribution of investments to higher employment 
can be estimated as +0,53% (0,409*13,4%), while the contribution 
of exports to higher employment can be estimated as +7% 
(0,182*38,6%). The joint contribution of investments and exports 
can be estimated as (+0,53) + (+7%) = +7,5%, a figure close to the 
effective value (+8,7%). The estimated decomposition shows that 
in Germany almost all the employment increase can be ascribed to 
the export increase and, presumably, the related expansion of 
investment capacity.  
The same exercise also shows that between 2008 and 2013, the 
employment decline in Spain, Italy and, to a minor extent, France 
can be ascribed to the fall of investments. 
In the case of Italy, we also performed a more detailed analysis of 
the direct impact on employment, by detailed sectors, of an 
exogenous increase (+10%) of real fixed investments, using the 
input-output matrix of the Italian economy in the year 2010, 
extended to 2013. The results are summarized in Table B.1. 
The input-output simulation for the Italian economy is focused on 
domestic demand, including imports, assuming the structure of 
exports as exogenous; the highest impact on employment is on the 
construction sector, which accounts for 41% of total employment, 
double the impact of employment in manufacturing. The impact on 
employment of a 10% increase in investments is estimated as 
340.000 jobs, around half the total impact implied by the previous 
long-term estimate of 660.000. An extended input-output model, 
with a partly endogenous final consumption, could account for a part 
of the gap (Toffoli, 2015).  
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4.1.2. Unemployment and the “Investment Gap” 
The unemployment rate is a measure of labour market imbalance in 
the European Union, which shows a clear diverging pattern for the 
four countries during the crisis. From 2007 to 2014, the 
unemployment rate doubled in Italy, tripled in Spain, slightly 
increased in France and sharply fell in Germany. Contrarily, from 
1999 to 2007 the unemployment rates for the four countries were 
decreasing or stable. The whole period from 1999-2013 is, therefore, 
the union of two distinct sub-periods: a period of “normal times” and 
a period of “exceptional times”, with the unemployment rates 
skyrocketing to 26% in Spain and doubling to 12% in Italy. 
The relationship over the entire period, between the (log of) 
employment rate and the (log of) unemployment rate is non-linear 
and backward bending in Italy and Spain (figure C.1, C.2) and 
linearly negative in Germany, where, since 2005, the unemployment 
rate has been steadily falling and the employment level rising. 
Contrastingly, there is no clear relationship in France. As a 
consequence, the unemployment-investment and the employment-
investment relationships could not be specified in the same way. 
Moreover, the impact of the 2008 crisis was much stronger on the 
unemployment rates, causing a higher instability of the parameters. 
To cope with these problems, and extract some economically 
informative parameters, we chose to run three VEC estimates: one 
for the entire period (Table B.2) and two separately for the subperiods 
1999q1-2007q4 and 2008q1-2013q4 (in the main text). Because the 
cost of separate estimates is a limited number of observations, we 
kept a parsimonious length structure. We make reference to the pre-
crisis unemployment rate to avoid the remarks raised by the 
European Commission to the NAWRU (2013). 
The main results are the following: a) unemployment rates and 
investments are cointegrated with the correct negative sign for all the 
countries and b) joint cointegration of the unemployment rates with 
investments and exports holds in Italy, but only in “normal times”, 
and in Germany in both periods, even if the parameters are weakly 
significant because of collinearity.  
18 
On average, the unemployment rate–investments elasticity is 
between -1 and -2, depending on the period and the country. Over the 
two separate periods, it ranges from a low of -0,6/-0,9 in France to a 
high of -3,6 in Germany, which becomes -2,1 if we exclude exports. 
In Italy, the elasticity is -2,3 while in Spain it is in the range of -1,5/-
1,7. In the case of France, the elasticity increases to -1,3 if we 
consider the entire period (Table 2.a. and 2.b.). 
 
Table 2.a 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log (unemployment rate) = 0 + 1*log(total investment) + 2*log(export) 
Period: 1999q1 2007q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN (1) FRANCE (1) GERMANY GERMANY GERMANY
Total investment -2,278 -1,712 -0,604 -3,638 -2,116 
(-5,16) (-2,50) (-4,13) (-3,45) T (-7,17) T 
Export -0,790 -0,463 -13,93 
(-2,82) (-0,44) T (-3,54) T 
C 36,667 19,610 8,988 49,487 26,465 167,775 
Lags 2** 2* 1* 3* 1* 1 no-coint 
White Test prob 0,0850° 0,5746 0,4675 0,3846 0,2350 0,5870 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 6,91 2,11 2,95 13,41 3,22 7,58 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 6,83 1,94 10,28 19,84 2,84 5,05 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less. No-coint means that the variable is not 
cointegrated 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T : trend added 
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Exports could partly replace the “investment gap”, but at the cost of a 
lower potential output. In Italy, the export variable is statistically 
significant, jointly with investment, over the entire period and from 
1999q1 to 2007q4. It is significant, but with the wrong sign, during the 
crisis. In Germany, the estimate of a long-term relationship between 
unemployment, investments and exports is fraught with problems of 
collinearity. For the joint estimates of investments and exports in the 
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“normal times”, investments are significant, while exports are with the 
right sign but not significant: in the “exceptional times”, both 
investments and exports are weakly significant. Considering the two 
variables separately, investments become significant in both periods, 
but exports are not cointegrated or have an implausible elasticity. Our 
VEC specification could not detect exports as a variable jointly 
cointegrated with investments in France and Spain. 
 
Table 2.b 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log (unemployment rate) = 0 + 1*log(total investment) + 2*log(export) 
Period: 2008q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN (1) FRANCE (1) GERMANY GERMANY GERMANY
Total investment -2,287 -1,498 -0,867 -0,336 -0,560 
(-38,97) (-5,71) (-4,06) T (-1,36) T (-3,84) T 
Export 0,472 -0,207 -6,568 
(6,52) (-1,23) T (-3,55) T 
C 22,129 19,329 11,485 9,295 9,360 82,683 
Lags 2* 2* 1* 4* 1* 1* 
White Test prob 0,2205° 0,3488 0,0970 n.a. 0,2716 0,1593 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 10,03 16,19 6,82 8,66 14,46 4,98 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 11,75 9,97 1,39 6,11 1,89 2,88 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T : trend added 
The main policy implication is that, relying solely on investments, in 
Spain and Italy it will take a long time to achieve the pre-crisis 
unemployment rates (from 2007) because of the severe investment 
drops of -37% in Spain and -27% in Italy. Even taking exports into 
account, halving the unemployment rate in Italy would require a 
long-term investment increase of +10% jointly with an export 
increase of 25%, which could imply an unemployment reduction of 
(-28%)+(-20%)=(-48%).  
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4.1.3. The Role of Public Investments 
Public investment is a small share of total fixed investment, which on 
average accounts for 11% in Germany, 14% in Italy, 15% in Spain, 
and 18% in France (1997-2013) of total fixed investments. However, 
public investment can be a crucial economic policy instrument in a 
period of prolonged crisis, when new private investments become 
very prudential and could benefit from an exogenous jump-start. To 
check the impact of public investments on employment and 
unemployment, we disaggregate total investments into public 
investments – for which Eurostat data are available – and private 
investments, which we measure as the difference between total 
investments and public investments. We use data at current prices, 
without seasonal adjustments, and run a VEC estimate jointly on 
private and public investments. The results regarding employment 
levels are shown in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log( total employment ) = 0 + 1*log(private investment) + 2*log(public investment) 
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Private investment 0,235 0,319 0,060 
(27,01) T (21,91) T (0,60) 
Public investment 0,026 0,028 0,171 0,395 
(5,15) T (3,29) T (5,65) (5,99) 
C  7,146 6,042 8,488 6,210 
Lags 4* 4* 4** 2* 
White Test prob 0,8010° 0,0236° 0,2955° 0,7964 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 8,12 6,26 6,98 54,42 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 13,53 14,77 10,60 36,78 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
° White Test 1999-2008: Spain 0,5604 
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The main result of these estimates regards Germany, which is the 
country where the employment impact of a public investment 
program would be the highest within the country and, possibly, 
would spillover on the other European countries.  
In France, the coefficient on public investment is also high, 
perhaps explaining the highest share of public on total investments. 
In Italy and Spain, the impact of public investments on total 
employment is the lowest, which could imply two policy 
implications: a) public investments are pro-cyclical and should be 
redressed to the goal of stabilizing employment levels and indirectly 
promoting private investments, and b) private investments are 
nonetheless more effective and should be promoted, sustaining 
private consumption jointly with fiscal and monetary policies. 
 
Table 2.1 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log(unemployment rate) = 0 + 1*log(private investment) + 2*log(public investment)
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Private investment 
-1,943 -0,747 -1,927 
(-18,95) T (-4,19) T (-7,27) 
Public investment 
-0,307 -0,065 -0,852 -1,460 
(-5,14) T (-0,59) T (-2,75) T (-11,22) 
C 26,161 10,648 10,016 37,551 
Lags 2* 2** 2* 2* 
White Test prob 0,1055 0,2726 0,2149 0,3038 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 15,43 25,78 10,16 71,42 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 10,71 18,86 14,44 15,75 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T: trend added 
 
The estimates of the long-term relationship between unemployment 
and investments, public and private, are consistent with our previous 
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results. With one exception, all the long-term elasticities of 
unemployment with respect to private and public investment are 
significant and the elasticities for private investments are higher than 
the elasticities for public investments. Our previously estimated 
elasticities on total unemployment lay in the range -1 to -2: the 
distinction between private and public investment extends the lower 
bound from -1 to -0.3.  
The case of Germany stands again on its own: the elasticity of 
public investment is the highest among the four countries and is not 
far away from the elasticity of private investments in Germany, 
which in turn have a value close to that of Italy.  
These two sets of estimates lend support to the idea that public 
investments are indeed crucial for economic recovery during this 
economic slump and, in the form of self-financing fiscal policy 
(Delong and Summers, 2012), could be pivotal in putting the economy 
back on a sustainable growth path (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013).  
 
4.2. Causes of the European Recession 
The economic policy of fiscal consolidation in Southern European 
countries has been the cause of a sudden decline in households’ 
disposable incomes through a higher fiscal burden and a government 
spending reduction. Less disposable income has brought about a 
severe consumption slump and a negative shift of consumers’ 
expectations. The underlying question is why households facing a 
sudden fiscal burden increase did not revert to saving to smooth 
consumption. The sudden consumption slump turned into a 
simultaneous investment drop because firms halted their investment 
plans for domestic demand. Foreign demand, through increasing 
exports, could not balance the fall of domestic demand and a second 
recession ensued.   
4.2.1. Consumption Slump and Precautionary Saving  
The dynamics of household consumption is the key to unbundle the 
chain of relationships underlying the second recession, from 2011q1 
to 20013q4, and the different patterns of recovery since 2014.  
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In Germany, household final consumption was always increasing, 
while in France, the rate of growth became negative for 6 quarters, 
from 2011q4 to 2013q1. In Spain and Italy, the consumption downturn 
was longer. In Spain, household consumption became negative for 11 
quarters, from 2011q1 to 2013q3, the same length as in Italy, which 
entered the negative zone somewhat later, from 2011q3 to 2014q1. In 
Italy, the trough of the consumption slump was in 2012q3 (-4,5%), 
while in Spain, it was in 2013q1 (-3,8%). Spain resumed a positive 
growth of exports in 2013q2, two quarters earlier than in Italy; since 
then, Spanish exports have grown at a higher growth rate than those in 
Italy. The positive relationship between consumption and imports, 
which holds for all four countries, brings back the overlooked 
constraint of the current account balance and the relationship with the 
unemployment rate, which is analysed in section 4.3.1.  
The household private consumption function we estimate is a 
function of gross disposable income, as measured homogenously by 
Eurostat sector accounts; therefore, disposable income for 
households is the sum of all income sources, namely labour, capital 
interest and dividends, public and private transfers, and the net of 
direct and indirect taxes and social contributions. 
Figure 2 

Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
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Consumption can be private or public. General government final 
consumption expenditures can be divided into individual 
consumption expenditures, which satisfy the needs of household 
members, with some degree of rivalry, such as health, education and 
social protection, and collective consumption expenditures, which 
provide services simultaneously to all the members of the 
community, without rivalry and explicit agreement, such as general 
public services, defence, and public order (Eurostat, 2011, 37). Our 
focus is on private final consumption: the difference between 
disposable income and saving is an accurate estimate of saving, a 
“buffer” on which to draw to smooth consumption. 
Our estimates are based on the values of gross disposable income 
and individual consumption for the Household Sector (including 
NPISH) of the European Sector Account, and also the National 
Accounts, when using data for individual and collective consumption 
expenditures of the general government. We use current values to 
allow for comparisons between countries, and between private and 
public consumption; we do not deflate variables because inflation 
decreases the purchasing power of income flows but may also 
increase the purchasing power of financial assets. Moreover, the 
annual inflation differential with Germany is small in the short run. 
Because the econometric estimates for consumption functions are 
based on gross disposable income, the coefficients are by 
construction the net addition of current income, permanent and 
transitory, and the yields from financial wealth. Our strategy is to 
estimate the consumption function stepwise: we first estimate a VEC 
model for the basic relationship between consumption and disposable 
income and then proceed to the full model. The long-term 
relationships, summarized in Table B.3, show different elasticities 
and a marginal propensity to consume between the four countries: 
the average propensity to consume is, however close, which implies 
a different intercept, usually interpreted as a measure of subsistence 
consumption. 
Because we base our estimates on gross disposable income, we 
cannot proceed to further estimates based on the sources of income, 
and a distinction between permanent and transitory components. We 
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can however propose a meaningful comparison with a different set of 
data from the Bank of Italy, which covers a longer and overlapping 
period, from 1980q1 to 2006q4 in Italy, shortly before the onset of 
the Great Recession. Thus, we extend our basic estimates to include 
financial wealth as well as interest rates. A distinct feature of the 
Bank of Italy’s estimate is its attempt to accommodate two structural 
breaks, in 1992q3 and 1998q1. Two procedures are proposed. The 
first is a deterministic control in the cointegration vector and the 
second is the inclusion of collective (public) consumption as measure 
of fiscal stance (Bassanetti and Zollino, 2008). In Table 4, we show 
two estimates of the Bank of Italy together with our estimates, 
tracking their variables as closely as possible. Without the 
adjustment for the structural breaks, the coefficients on disposable 
income estimated by the Bank of Italy have a weaker economic 
meaning, while the inclusion of collective (public) consumption 
strikingly improves the results (column F of Table B.4). 
The comparison of the coefficients over the two overlapping 
periods (Eurostat does not cover housing wealth data) shows similar 
elasticity coefficients for consumption with respect to disposable 
income and financial wealth. However, in our estimates, the 
coefficients on bonds and collective consumption have the same 
magnitude, but positive signs (the opposite of the Bank of Italy 
estimates), meaning that a fall in bond yields and collective 
consumption lowers disposable income. The sharp increase of the tax 
burden and the sovereign debt crisis can explain the different signs. 
In 2012q4, the fiscal burden in Italy (direct+indirect taxes/GDP) 
reached its highest level, with a sudden increase of 2 points of GDP 
with respect to 2011q4 (figure C. 3). In 2012q4, collective 
consumption decreased by -7% with respect to 2011q4 (figure C.4). 
In our estimates, consumption declines with the decrease of 
collective consumption, which we take as a measure, direct and 
indirect, of the fiscal stance. In 2014, the tax burden, including social 
contributions, in Italy peaked at 45.5% of the GDP. 
This argument is consistent with a closer look at the official data. 
In Italy and Spain, collective consumption began to decline 
(quarterly yoy) in 2012q1 and plunged to -10% in Spain and -7% in 
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Italy in 2012q4, while in France and Germany collective 
consumption kept growing. In Italy, total taxation (direct plus 
indirect) kept constantly growing (yoy) from 2011q1 to 2012q4, 
while in Spain and, to a lesser degree, in France, total taxation spiked 
abruptly in 2012q4. The estimates in Table 3 are consistent with this 
empirical evidence. 
Finally, the coefficient on the 10 years Italian bonds is positive 
and quite significant. We interpret the result as a measure of the risk 
premium on Italian bonds, beyond what was already accounted for 
by the gross disposable income, which allowed a direct positive 
impact on the consumption of the subset of financial investors.  
We extend our estimate of the consumption function to Spain, 
France and Germany, with some adaptations for each country (Table 
3), taking into account our previous analysis of the empirical 
evidence on collective consumption and total taxation (direct plus 
indirect).  
In Spain, the high consumption elasticity is related to the 
housing bubble. From 1999 to 2007, real household consumption 
expenditures recorded the highest increase in Spain, +34%, 
followed by France, +20%, Italy, +8%, and Germany, + 5%. In 
Spain, the housing bubble was therefore associated with a 
consumption spree, followed by a retreat when the bubble burst and 
fiscal burden became tighter. Consumption tumbled by -10% 
between 2007 and 2013. We detect the impact of the fiscal stance 
in Spain with the value of direct and indirect taxes (total taxation), 
which peaked +13% in 2012q4 (yoy). The variable “total taxation” 
enters the regression with the expected negative sign, and decreases 
direct consumption after controlling for gross disposable income. 
With regard to the yields on 10 years bonds, the result is similar to 
the one for Italy. We chose to regress consumption on the German 
spread to obtain a more significant coefficient and allow a further 
test of the crisis. In 2013, consumption in Spain was still +20% 
higher than in 1999. 
In France, household consumption increased steadily and 
regularly, by +22% from 1999 to 2013 and by +2% from 2007 to 
2013; the elasticities coefficients on disposable income and financial 
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wealth are similar to the consumption function in Italy, but French 
income and consumption paths are on a higher and more stable level.  
 
Table 3 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Log(Individual consumption) = 0 + 1*log(disposable income) + 2*log(net financial 
assets)+ 3*(interest rate) + 4*log(collective consumption/total taxation) 
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Disp. Income 0,644 1,321 0,804 1,596 
(3,46) (12,26) (15,00) (16,12) T 
Fin. Assets 0,142 0,122 0,159 0,030 
(1,48) (1,48) (4,07) (0,95) T 
Bonds 10 year   0,052 0,011 
(6,13) (2,26) 
Collective 
consumption 
0,312 0,114 
(2,93) (3,47) T 
Spread (Germany) 0,027 
(9,02) 
Total taxation 
-0,239 
(-2,20) 
Bond 3 months 0,0006 
(0,71) T 
C  
-1,310 -3,081 -0,082 -9,417 
Lags 4* 4* 4* 2* 
White Test prob 0,5480 0,4380 0,3351 0,1719 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 33,36 28,09 20,21 64,17 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 41,05 29,55 13,15 29,90 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
T: trend added 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
 
In Germany, consumption increased steadily, by +11% over the 
period 1999-2013, as did disposable income. The elasticity 
coefficient on gross disposable income, which is 0,941 when income 
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is the only dependent variable, increases significantly to 1,596 if we 
include financial variables and collective consumption as a measure 
of fiscal stance. The financial variables, which also have a positive 
sign, are not statistically significant, which is consistent with the fall 
of financial yields on Germany’s bonds. The specification, including 
financial wealth, is necessary to obtain a correct estimate.  
According to Eurostat statistics, Germany recorded an upward 
trend in the household net financial wealth to disposable income ratio, 
after the Internet bubble of 2000. The ratio in Germany increased 
from to 1,47 in 2000 – it was 1,12 in 1996 – to a high of 1,93 in 2013. 
The German fiscal stance remained more favourable to consumption 
and saving, and the collective consumption expenditures of the 
general government recorded an increase of +22%, from 1999 to 
2013. The saving rate remained stable, sustained by high social 
protection benefits.  
A comparison with Table 3.1 improves our understanding of the 
turning points of the crisis and the role of saving as a “buffer”. 
Germany is the only country where no break occurred over the entire 
period.  
 
4.2.2. The Structural Breaks  
 
This section has a double purpose: to identify structural breaks and 
test the role of saving as a “buffer” during the crisis. To detect the 
break dates, we use the Bai-Perron procedure (2003) and then 
compare the break dates with the economic policy of the quarter 
identified. We use the same variables lagged one period, excluding 
the fiscal stance and including the level of the saving rate; the 
inclusion of the saving rate is motivated by our previous analysis 
(Campiglio, 2013) as well as the role of household saving as a 
“buffer-stock” (Carroll, 1996). We use OLS because it allows the 
identification of the break dates, according to two possible methods, 
sequential and repartition (Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1. 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
Log(Individual consumption) = 0 + 1*log(disposable incomet-1) + 2*log(net financial 
assetst-1)+ 3*(interest ratet-1) + 4*log(saving ratet-1) 
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Disp.Incomet-1 0,514 0,833 0,436 0,819 
(5,90) T (28,01) (3,93) T (3,67) 
Fin.Assetst-1 0,154 0,222 0,063 0,016 
(2,92) T (4,51) (1,09) T (0,16) 
Bonds 10 yeart-1   -0,005 0,001 0,009 -0,007 
(-1,45) T (0,20) (1,47) T (-0,99) 
Saving ratet-1 -0,088 -0,014 -0,108 0,017 
(-5,61) T (-2,53) (-4,92) T (0,48) 
C  3,780 -1,134 6,133 1,891 
(4,82) (-2,03) (4,38) (1,12) 
Breaks 
Criteria sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
2008Q4 2007Q4 2008Q1/2008Q4 no break 
2011Q3 2010Q4 
White Test prob 0,123 0,338 0,022 0,108 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey pr 0,104 0,476 0,193 0,003 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 1,49 0,59 0,10 2,58 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 18,44 16,17 35,97 49,35 
t-statistic in parenthesis 
T: trend added 
 
In Italy, we detect two break points: 2008q4 – just before the 
beginning of the 2009 crisis – and 2011q3, which marked the 
beginning of a prolonged period of recession, currently defined by 
the NBER as a “significant decline in economic activity spread 
across the economy, lasting more than a few months”. Italy’s second 
recession complies with this definition, lasting 14 quarters (with the 
exception of 2013q3). In the last quarter of 2011, the new 
government in office approved and enacted a law regarding pensions 
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and the labour market. In France, the 2008q1-2008q4 break marks 
the onset of the following 2009 crisis, while 2010q4 marks the initial 
downturn in household final consumption, lasting 6 quarters, from 
2011q4 to 2013q1. In Spain, 2007q4 marks the peak of fixed 
investments and the turning point of the housing bubble, and the two 
following consumption crisis. The first lasted 7 quarters, from 
2008q3 to 2010q1, and the second 12 quarters, from 2011q1 to 
2013q4.
A further question is why the increasing fiscal burden, which 
prompted the second European crisis, had a severe impact on 
consumption, missing the smoothing coming from household saving. 
The question has to be split into two: the first is whether the saving 
rate, or its change, has a significant impact on consumption. In the 
affirmative case, the second is why the households did not draw on 
their savings.  
The estimates of Table 3.1 confirm a negative relationship 
between the consumption level and the lagged level of the saving 
rate in Italy, Spain and France. In Italy, the negative elasticity of -
0,09 implies that a 10% decrease in the savings rate level prompts a 
+0,9% increase in the level of consumption. In Germany, the sign is 
positive but not significant. If we substitute the level with the 
percentage change of the savings rate, the coefficients are all 
significant with negative signs, including in Germany (Table B.5). 
Saving has therefore a crucial precautionary role because it can be 
used as a “buffer” to smooth consumption. Its impact on 
consumption depends, however, on the savings (and wealth) 
distribution. The savings distribution is more concentrated than the 
income distribution, as happens with the wealth distribution. The 
higher the concentration, the lower the share of households with 
positive precautionary saving; however, a lower share of households 
with positive savings can precipitate a crisis in a more severe slump 
and delay the timing of the recovery. This is clear when lower 
income families are in debt, with negative savings. Carroll (1992) 
drew due and early attention to the lower tail income, pointing to the 
economic meaning of zero, or near-zero, incomes as an economic 
fact rather than a measurement error. 
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As Keynes already noted, “unemployment is likely to be 
associated with negative saving (our emphasis) in certain quarters, 
private or public, because the unemployed may be living either on 
saving of themselves and their friends or on public relief which is 
partly financed out of loans; with the result that re-employment will 
gradually diminish these particular acts of negative saving and 
reduce, therefore, the marginal propensity to consume more rapidly” 
(Keynes, 136, 121).  
This is the process that has marked the US recovery, with the 
personal savings rate bouncing back to 10.5% in December 2012, 
and then falling again to 4.9% in December 2014. The generalization 
of this process to the entire economy is what has come to be named 
the deleveraging process, especially with regard to the financial 
sector (Koo, 2008; Eggertsson, Krugman 2013, Wolf 2014).  
 
4.2.3. Investment Slump 
The investment function is estimated treating investments as 
dependent from the consumption demand of domestic households, 
the foreign demand measured by the exports and a measure of profits. 
Figure 1 shows, in the case of Italy, the main variables we want to 
model. Investment increases slowly but steadily until 2007, led by 
exports and consumption growth, and then from 2008q1 to 2009q1, 
consumption, exports and investments collapse simultaneously. In 
2011q1, consumption drops again, plunging much more deeply, and 
the moderate growth of exports cannot balance the collapse of 
consumption, which returned to the level of 1999. The simultaneity 
of the changes between investments and consumption points to a 
crucial asymmetry of the investment process; delaying or halting an 
investment in progress can be immediate, while the decision to start a 
new investment, risking capital for a required rate of return, takes a 
longer time to materialize. A new investment takes a longer time to 
become operational, while an old investment, or an investment in 
progress, can be stopped immediately.  
The period we estimate underwent a structural change, detected 
by the breaks we measured above, which means that sudden 
adjustments occurred and the economic system of the countries 
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analysed are still in the process of a rapid transformation. This is, 
presumably, the reason why our attempts to find out a long-term 
estimate between the variables were inconclusive. The main variable, 
the year-on-year rate of change of household final consumption, can 
also be interpreted as the cumulated sum of the monthly rate of 
change of consumption. In this way, we are implicitly assuming a lag 
for the investment decision. The rates of change of exports and 
(estimated) profits are instead simultaneous, implying a plausible 
short response to an increasing foreign demand and the firms’ 
financial stability. Our estimates are the following (Table 4): 
 
Table 4 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
d(log(total investment)) = 0 + 1*d(log(individual consumption)) + 
2*d(log(export))+ 3*d(profit) 
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Real consumption (yoy) 0,191 0,313 0,239 0,352 
(3,12) (7,02) (4,67) T (2,48) 
Real export 0,273 0,193 0,249 0,363 
(4,56) (2,85) (5,22) T (3,80) 
Profit 0,144 0,007 0,067 0,156 
(1,73) (0,10) (1,69) T (1,34) 
C  -0,010 -0,022 -0,012 -0,016 
(-3,21) (-6,24) (-2,82) T (-3,02) 
White Test prob 0,233 0,057 0,168 0,775 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 0,45 0,50 2,86 1,49 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 0,80 1,12 1,15 2,88 
t statistics in parenthesis 
T: trend added 
 
All three variables are significant for all four countries, and their 
economic meaning can be better understood with reference to the 
ratio of exports/GDP and the ratio of household final 
consumption/GDP (figures C. 5 and C.6 – chain linked). Dividing 
the first ratio with respect to the second, we obtain the ratio 
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exports/household final consumption (figure C.7). We discuss the 
last one because it summarizes the other two.  
From 1999 to 2009, a diverging path prevailed. In Germany, 
exports jumped and the share of domestic consumption declined, 
while in the other three countries, export increases were much lower 
and the consumption share remained constant, or increased only 
slightly (in France). During the two crises, a “new normal” arose, 
with an increase of exports and a decrease of household consumption 
share. From 2009 to 2013, the rates of export increases converged 
sharply and, with the exception of France, the share of household 
consumption declined (Germany and Spain) or remained stable 
(Italy). Export-led growth in the Euro Zone was widespread from 
Germany to the other countries, and the Euro Zone has become much 
more export oriented.  
 
4.3. Consequences of the European Recession 
4.3.1. The Unemployment-Current Account Trade-Off 
Since the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, the issue of current 
account balance returned to the centre stage, especially for the 
European economies and their economic policy, and it is a closely 
watched measure of imbalance by the European Union (EU 2014). 
The impressive size of gross capital flows that prompted the 
sovereign debt crisis of Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, Spain and Italy 
apparently overshadowed the role of the current account in favour of 
the Net International Investment Position (NIIP), defined as the 
difference between the economy’s gross foreign assets (A) and its 
gross foreign liabilities (L). Because it can be shown that for most 
countries, the cumulated current account closely tracks the NIIP, the 
relationship can mask either a current account balance or represent a 
signal of elevated macroeconomic and financial stress, which should 
warn policy-makers about potential stability risks of globalized 
financial markets (Obstfeld, 2012). The sovereign debt crisis has 
rekindled the debate regarding possible imbalances of current 
account and capital movements within the Euro Zone, whose cross-
border debits and credits are processed through the Target2 system.  
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The Target2 system, originally designed for the purpose of cross-
border payments, accomplished its role with an almost zero balance 
until 2007. It has been argued, however, that after the onset of the 
Great European Recession the Target2 system changed its original 
role, and became an ECB policy instrument, allowing an indirect 
funding of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Cyprus 
(GIPSIC). The proof would be that the cumulated current account 
deficits correspond to an equal amount of Target2 claims by 
Germany, Netherlands and Finland (Sinn 2014, 188).  
This argument has been questioned on the ground that Target2 net 
balances cannot be automatically linked to current-account deficits in 
specific countries and cannot be directly capped without putting into 
question the basic functioning of the Euro Zone currency union (Buiter 
et al., 2011). The currency union argument is echoed by an historical 
comparison between the Euro Zone countries and the US regional 
Reserve Banks between 1913 and 1960. Their relationship was 
characterized by mutual assistance, smoothing the long-term swings of 
alternative economic fortunes of different states. According to this 
experience Target2 should be viewed as a form of cooperation, 
deemed essential for the Euro Area (Eichengreen et al., 2014).  
The issue of alternative economic fortunes is crucial. After the 
German reunification, the current account remained negative until 
the year 2000, while the international investment position fell almost 
to zero. The current account balance bounced back positively in 2002 
(Figure C.8), immediately after December 2011, when China became 
a member of the WTO. It steadily increased since then, with a 
corresponding growth of the international investment position, 
reaching a record level of 1.200 billion at the end of 2013 (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2014b). 
The 2013 Annual Report of the Bundesbank points to the non-
price factors, such as brand preferences, behind the outstanding 
export success enjoyed by German automotive groups, in contrast to 
the difficulties of the Euro Zone competitors. German 
competitiveness hinges on innovation and an “employment-friendly 
stance for most of the last decade, making it easier for industry to 
keep and extend high-quality production stages of the value chain in 
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Germany, despite labour costs, by international standards, remaining 
at high level” (Deutsche Bundesbank, Annual Report 2014a, 43). 
While Hartz reforms of the labour market, in three waves between 
2003 and 2005, helped to improve the efficiency of matching in the 
labour market (Klinger and Roth, 2010), the economic fortunes of 
Germany turned suddenly positive in 2002 with the opportunity to 
enter the huge new Asian markets “making the right stuff at the right 
time” (The Economist, 2013). 
In the absence of mutual assistance, which can balance alternate 
countries’ fortunes over decades, unemployment arises as a new 
binding constraint, which creates a new trade-off between 
sustainable unemployment rates and zero balance of the current 
account. 
We estimate the current account (% of GDP) as a function of the 
unemployment rate for Italy, Spain, France and Germany, on the 
assumption that unemployment is a proxy of domestic demand, 
which includes imports (we do not use logarithms because of 
negative values). Table 5 shows the main values using VEC 
estimates. 
Current account and unemployment are cointegrated and the 
White test is significant, even if at a low level for Spain and France. 
Indeed, the test is more significant when considering the subperiod 
1999-2008, before the crisis. In doing so, however, we do not include 
the period 2009-2013, when the current account rebalancing 
occurred. Only if we cover the entire period, 1999-2013, can we 
estimate the level of unemployment corresponding to a zero balance 
for the current account.  
In the case of Italy, the unemployment rate compatible with a zero 
current account balance is 11%, a magnitude, which bears a close 
analogy with the current estimates for the NAWRU. The snag is that 
a trade-off between unemployment and current account balance 
arises and, more precisely, with the level of unemployment 
compatible with zero balance of the current account. 
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Table 5  
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Current account= 0 + 1*unemployment rate 
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Unemployment 
Ratet-1 
0,517 1,010 0,965 0,956 
(2,92) (6,90) T (4,38) T (8,72) T 
C  -5,561 -11,467 -5,753 -10,463 
Lags 4* 4* 4** 4* 
  
        
Unemployment compatible with zero current account 
Zero Current 
Account 
Unemployment Rate 
10,756 11,353+0,250*T 5,961+0,102*T 10,944-0,236*T 
        
White Test prob 0,1109° 0,0076° 0,0722° 0,3151° 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 1,69 5,82 4,12 3,01 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 3,44 11,56 1,22 6,19 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less;  
 ** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10%                
T: trend added  
White Test 1999-2008: Italy 0,673; Spain 0,706; France 0,736 
 
Within the Euro Area, the level of unemployment compatible with 
zero balance of the current account can stay negative for a long 
period, as in Germany in the 1990s, allowing the economy the time 
necessary to readjust its structure. In the cases of Spain and France, 
the inclusion of a trend allows us to estimate a lower bound of the 
unemployment rate, which is 11% in Spain and 6% in France. In 
both cases, the positive trend implies a higher level during the recent 
crisis. In the case of Germany, the estimate is instead related to an 
upper bound, rather than a lower bound; the trend coefficient is 
negative, implying a lower unemployment rate during the crisis. The 
actual total unemployment rates in 2013 were 12.2% in Italy, 26.1% 
in Spain, 10.3% in France and 5.3% in Germany.  
These estimates imply quite different economic policies; while at 
present Germany enjoys a very low level of unemployment, almost 
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the same level is reachable in France as a lower bound, improving 
investments and exports. However, in Italy, and even more in Spain, 
the lower bound of the unemployment rate is overestimated or too 
high. If the unemployment rate is too high, a trade-off between a 
positive current account and a sustainable unemployment rate arises. 
On the other hand, productivity improvements or lower oil prices 
could lessen the current account constraint. 
 
4.3.2. Inflation gaps and the threshold of nominal price 
rigidity  
The European crisis is the first experience, since WW II, of a mild 
deflation spreading through many countries and originating from the 
goods market. Downward nominal rigidity admits a temporary 
degree of flexibility through discounts and price policies, while 
deflation implies downward flexibility of nominal prices, and 
therefore a backward chain reaction on the prices, especially wages, 
which form the global chain of value. While the issues of inflation 
and hyperinflation can count on a vast theoretical and econometric 
literature, the same cannot be said about deflation, with the exception 
of Japan, where deflation was anticipated by an initial burst of the 
asset bubble in 1990, and only after the second-half of the 1990s 
spread to the goods market.  
A debated question is whether the inflation slowdown in Europe 
could foreshadow a lasting low inflation or an outright deflation, 
becoming a cause, jointly with a decline in the full-employment 
interest rate, of a looming “secular stagnation” (Summers, 2014). 
Historical estimates show that forecasting the timing and severity of 
deflation is more difficult than inflation (Burdekin, Siklos, 2004), but, 
as Bernanke put it, “The sources of deflation are not a mystery. 
Deflation is in almost all cases a side effect of a collapse of 
aggregate demand … likewise the economic effects of a deflationary 
episode, for the most part, are similar to those of any sharp decline in 
aggregate spending, namely, recession, rising unemployment, and 
financial stress” (Bernanke, 2002).  
Since the inception of the Euro Zone in 1999, the rate of annual 
inflation in Spain and Italy has been constantly higher than the rate 
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of inflation in Germany, with the exception of 2013. Between 2013 
and 1999, the inflation gap with respect to Germany accumulated a 
divergence of 20 points in Spain, 11 points in Italy, and only a 
minimal gap of 3 points in France. Given the initial parity conversion 
to the euro in 1999, the loss of price competitiveness accumulated so 
far would require, lacking the adjustment through devaluation, a 
corresponding negative inflation gap, or internal devaluation, with 
respect to Germany. 
 
Figure 3  

Source: our calculations on Eurostat 
 
Over the last two years, the inflation gap has been partially filled by 
internal devaluation and a mild deflation. We can measure how the 
gap has been reduced by looking to the quarter when the inflation 
rates began to be lower than the ones in Germany. The relevant dates 
are 2012q4 in France, 2013q2 in Italy and 2013q3 in Spain. 
Comparing the inflation rates in Germany and each country over the 
corresponding periods, we can estimate a devaluation of -1% in 
France, -2,2% in Spain and -2,8% in Italy. Should this trend continue 
for at least two years, the adjustment would be almost complete; the 
problem is that, as the EU officially acknowledges, “slow growth and 
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low inflation weigh on the reduction of imbalances and 
macroeconomic risk” (EU 2014, 2).  
The crisis, prompted by fiscal austerity measures and the 
falling internal demand for consumption and investments, dragged 
on a downside comovement of the inflation rates, well below the 2% 
inflation target of the ECB. The sequence of the downside turning 
points of inflation (yoy monthly) was the following: October 2011 in 
Germany, December 2011 in France, March 2012 in Italy, and 
October 2012 in Spain. Outright deflation appeared for the first time 
in Spain in March 2014, in Italy in August 2014, and in France and 
Germany in January 2015. The growing threat of a European 
deflation prompted the European Central Bank to announce a 
package of non-standard monetary measure in March 2015, with the 
aim of fostering a wider economic recovery and gradually increasing 
inflation rates. 
 
Table 6 
Vector Error Correction Estimates (SA) 
Inflationt= 0 + 1*d(log(individual consumption)) + 2*d(log(oil price)) 
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE 
Real consumption (yoy) 0,114 0,138 0,131 
(2,55) (8,40) (3,42) 
Oil Price (€) 0,978 5,543 4,325 
(0,43) (3,68) (2,53) 
C  1,809 1,785 1,217 
Lags 4* 2* 4* 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
 
To analyse the inflation dynamics, we need to focus on the 
imbalances of the goods market, the oil market – whose price 
dynamics are crucial for the European economy – and the labour 
market. A VEC estimate of the rates of change allows us to measure 
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the long-term impact of the rates of change of domestic consumption 
and the price in euros of oil. The real growth rate of consumption is 
obtained by deflating the nominal rate with a seasonal price index 
(SA). We could not obtain similar results for Germany. The 
estimates are shown in Table 6. 
The two variables, real growth of domestic consumption and 
growth of oil prices, are both significant for Spain and France; the 
coefficient on oil is significant in Spain and France (but not in Italy), 
where, however, its magnitude is much higher than the one for real 
consumption. 
The long-term estimates raise the following question: how much 
of a percentage decline in household real consumption is 
theoretically required to force a zero rate of inflation? This 
percentage is the threshold of the consumption drop, which can force 
a break to the downward nominal price rigidity. Between 2007 and 
2013, real consumption decreased in Spain by -10% and in Italy by -
8%. The theoretical fall of consumption, which would have implied a 
zero rate of inflation, is higher and can be estimated as -13% in Spain 
and -16% in Italy. Spain is the country with the lowest gap between 
theoretical and effective declines, while in Italy the effective 
consumption decline is half the theoretical estimate. The estimate for 
France has a marginal economic meaning because real consumption 
increased in the period. 
However, some caveats are in order. If we split the entire period 
to before and after 2007, the coefficients become more unstable and 
volatile, increasing their magnitude substantially after 2007.  
Inflation dynamics in the four countries show a close 
comovement, as the dates of the inflation turning point suggest; 
therefore, we choose to add a Seemingly Unrelated Regression to 
the VEC estimate, whose specification and estimates are shown in 
Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates 
Inflationt= 0 + 1inflationt-1 + 2 inflationt-2 + 3*d(log(individual consumption)) +   
4*d(log(oil price)) + 5*d(log(unemployment rate)) 
Period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Inflationt-1  0,783 0,836 0,867 0,819 
(8,18) (8,86) (10,50) (8,14) 
Inflationt-2 -0,026 -0,200 -0,231 -0,114 
(-0,26) (-2,46) (-3,06) (-1,24) 
Real consumption (yoy SA) 0,070 0,067 0,059 0,063 
(4,25) (4,59) (3,76) (2,37) 
Oil Price (€) 0,829 1,865 1,293 1,407 
(2,19) (3,43) (3,77) (4,26) 
Unemployment (yoy) .. .. .. -0,843 
(-1,95) 
C  0,185 0,472 0,353 0,210 
(1,06) (2,62) (2,94) (1,52) 
Drop in consumption 
implied by zero inflation 
-13,5 -16,5 -16,8 -14,5 
t statistics in parenthesis 
.. not significant at 10% 
 
The OLS estimates for each single country identify a common break 
in 2007q4 in Italy and Spain, which can be associated with the onset 
of the first crisis, and another in France in 2004q4, for which we do 
not have an economic explanation. Germany does not show any 
break (Table B.6).  
The break of the 2008 crisis impinges on the size of the elasticity 
coefficients, as the previous break test suggests, at least in the cases 
of Italy and Spain; therefore, a separate estimate of the “normal” 
period (1999-2008) from the “exceptional” period (2008-2013) 
becomes necessary. The results, with a SUR estimate, are the 
following (Table 7): 
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Table 7 
Elasticity-Threshold ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Elasticity of inflation to consumption 
 1999q1-2013q4 0,070 0,067 0,059 0,063 
 1999q1-2007q4 0,081 0,079 0,082 0,036 
 2008q1-2013q4 0,164 0,070 0,126 0,179 
Consumption drop for a zero inflation 
 1999q1-2013q4 - 13,5% -16,5% -16,8% -14,5% 
 1999q1-2007q4 -13,3% -14,1% -   9,7% -27,3% 
 2008q1-2013q4 -  4,6% -16,0% -   7,4% -  2,7% 
Effective consumption drop/increase 2008q1-2013q4 
2008q1-2013q4  (1) -7,5% -12,0% + 2,3% +4,5% 
2008q1-2013q4  (2) -7,8% -10,2% + 2,0% +5,2% 
(1) ESA2010, (2) ESA05  
 
The elasticities of inflation to consumption are significantly different 
between the two periods. In “exceptional times” of crisis, the 
elasticities are higher than in the “normal” times for all the countries. 
Therefore, the average estimates mask a non-linearity, which 
surfaces splitting the two periods. Regarding the threshold measure, 
as the implied consumption drop, we can check that the ex-post 
consumption drop exceeds the threshold in the case of Italy. In the 
case of Spain, which exhibits a sharp rise and fall of consumption 
(figure 2), the high threshold is below but close to the ex-post 
consumption drop. In principle, the issue should not be a problem for 
France and Germany; however, as shown in Figure 3, these countries 
are also at risk of low inflation or mild deflation. The gap between 
ex-post inflation and thresholds can be explained as a process of 
contagion inside the Euro Zone.  
The same exercise can be carried out on the coefficients of oil 
price changes, which measure the ratio ( % change inflation rate/ % 
oil price in euros), i.e., the elasticity of inflation with respect to a 
given oil price change, ranging from a low of 0,829 in Italy to a high 
of 1,865 in Spain. In addition, a problem with the instability of the 
coefficient arises with these estimates because of the economic crisis 
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and also as a consequence of the wide swings in oil prices, which 
ranged from a peak of 120$ in March 2012 to a trough of 50$ at the 
beginning of 2015. Should the low oil prices stabilize, then the 
benefits, such as lower unemployment rates compatible with zero 
current account, will have to be weighted with a radical restructuring 
of world demand and supply between OPEC countries and Western 
countries plus China. In the process, deflation would set in. We do 
not know enough about how the Euro Zone could bear a mild 
deflation and the possible contagion between the member countries; 
indeed, going back to “normal” inflation seems the safer option.  
One final remark on the relationship between inflation and the 
unemployment rate: Germany is the only country where the negative 
relationship holds and is significant. The estimate on the entire 
period breaks down if we split the period before and after the period, 
and the relationship is very significant only before the economic 
crisis, from 1999q1 to 2007q4, (it changes sign from 2008q1 to 
2013q4). 
A higher indirect tax burden also influenced inflation and 
consumption. Higher indirect taxes directly depress domestic 
consumption when they are fully passed on in higher prices and 
indirectly depress domestic consumption when they are only partly 
passed on because higher indirect taxes depress domestic demand 
through lower real disposable income or lower profits. Even in the 
latter case, the tax effect measured by the former hypothesis is a 
significant approximation of its lowering impact on consumption 
(Figure C.9)  
If we make the hypothesis that higher indirect taxes were 
implemented and fully passed on to inflation, the cumulated impact 
on the period 2011q1 to 2014q3 added 2,2 points of inflation in 
Spain, 1,6 points in Italy and 0,9 in France, while the impact on 
Germany’s inflation was zero. The order of inflation turning points, 
as noted above, is the exactly the reverse: Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain. Alternatively, if we deduce the tax effect, inflation in Spain 
has hovered around zero since April 2013 and in Italy since March 
2014. The implication would seem to be that the deflation pressure 
and contagion, originating from the decreased demand in the goods 
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market, originated earlier than the official measures signalled, with a 
delay masked by the increase of indirect taxes.  
The ECB single mandate for its monetary policy has exacerbated 
downward deflation pressures in spite of its acknowledgement that 
“not only inflation above 2% but also deflation, i.e., a self-sustaining 
fall in the broad price index, is inconsistent with price stability”, and 
that, “it is more difficult for monetary policy to fight deflation than 
to fight inflation” … “monetary policy may not be able to provide a 
sufficient degree of support to the economy by using its interest 
instrument” (The Monetary policy of the ECB 2011, 66). Non-
standard monetary measures adopted in March 2015 confirm what 
was anticipated by the ECB. The Federal Reserve monetary, with its 
double mandate of price stability and employment, as stated in 1977 
(Public Law, 1977), has a wider space for policy action, which is still 
needed because the shadows of low inflation are still present. 
 
4.3.3. Germany’s exports model 
Germany’s exports model is often proposed as a solution to the 
sluggish growth of the European countries. Germany’s success in 
foreign markets, and the related boom of its current account balance, 
is officially claimed as an imbalance to be corrected. The Alert 
Mechanism Report 2015 has warned against the increasing current 
account balance because it is “driven mainly by a reduction in 
exports to the rest of the euro area, rather than an increase in imports 
by Germany … [and because it is] the result of low domestic demand, 
including investments, as well as strong competitiveness” (EU 2014; 
7,21). As a consequence, a pattern of divergent growth has 
resurfaced among the European countries. From 2010 to 2013, 
economic growth outside the Euro Zone was positive, or non-
negative, in the U.K., Poland, Sweden, Romania, Latvia (joining 
Euro in 2014), Bulgaria, and Lithuania, and inside the Euro Zone in 
Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Estonia, Malta and France. The 
countries where real GDP declined were Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Croatia, Cyprus, Slovenia, and the Czech 
Republic. 
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The pattern described for the EU countries can be summarized, 
over the period 2000-2013, by a positive relationship between GDP 
and exports changes (Figure C.11). A closer look at this relationship 
shows that, with the exception of Ireland and the Czech Republic, all 
the countries with a positive economic performance through the 
crisis also had a strong economic relationship with Germany. In fact, 
according to our estimates, the shares of exports to Germany to total 
exports (intra and extra UE), over the period 2008-2013, in Czech 
Republic averaged 32%, in Austria 31%, in The Netherlands and 
Poland 26%, in Hungary 25%, in Luxembourg 21%, in Slovakia 
20%, in Belgium and Romania 18%, in France 16% and in Italy and 
Portugal 13% (Table 8). 
Germany’s border countries form a cluster, which fully qualify 
with the goal of reindustrialization proposed in the European 
Competitiveness Report (2014, 22), quantified with a target of 20% 
of industry over the total gross value added for the EU countries. In 
2013, the only European countries where the manufacturing shares 
were above the 20% threshold were Germany, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Ireland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Lithuania. 
Germany is obviously at the centre of this cluster. Therefore, a shock 
to Germany’s exports has a bigger impact, positive or negative, 
primarily on border countries, which dies away as the European 
countries are geographically farther apart. Spain is an exception 
because its exports of goods to Germany increased substantially, 
more than the corresponding increase of exports from Italy and 
France.  
In 1999, Germany’s current account balance, as a share of GDP, 
was still slightly negative. It became positive in 2002 and jumped to 
7,5% in 2013; simultaneously, the export/GDP ratio almost doubled, 
from 26% in 1999 to 47% in 2014 (ESA2010). In Japan, an economy 
of bigger but comparable size, the corresponding ratio increased 
from 11% in 2000 to 16% in 2013, while in the US it was 14%. 
Korea is the only comparable country with a similar pattern of 
exports, booming to 54% in 2013 (Figure C.10).  
The extraordinary export, performance of Germany can be partly 
explained if we consider only the flow of exports going outside the 
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EU (we use data ESA05). From 1999 to 2013 the 20-point increase 
in the export/GDP ratio was equally shared between the EU countries 
and extra-EU countries. If we consider the EU as a single economic 
entity, the export/GDP ratio of Germany in 2013 becomes 20%, a 
level still higher than in Japan and the US, but within a more 
reasonable range. 
 
Table 8 
Ranking of countries by German share of total exports of goods 
Country Share of total exports to Germany 
% of exports to Germany 
2008-2013 
Czech Republic 31,7 25,5 
Austria 30,5 7,5 
The Netherlands 25,7 15,2 
Poland 25,6 33,4 
Hungary 25,4 7,7 
Luxembourg 21,3 -16,3 
Slovakia 20 42,1 
Belgium 18,3 -5,8 
Romania 18,2 66,3 
France 16,1 7,8 
Italy 12,7 2,9 
Portugal 12,7 11,1 
Bulgaria 10,9 98,4 
Spain 10,6 20,9 
Sweden 10 -2 
UK 9,9 -2 
Lithuania 8,5 53 
Estonia 5 29,8 
N.B. The share of total export value to Germany is averaged from 2008-2013. 
Our calculation on Eurostat data on international trade HS2-HS4 [DS-016894] 
 
If we select the period 2007-2013, however, the result is quite 
different. The export/GDP ratio of Germany increases by 3,5 points, 
with a decrease of 1 point inside the EU area and a further increase 
of 4,5 to extra-EU countries (as argued by the Alert Report 2015). 
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Germany escaped the Great European Recession thanks to the Asian 
and the US markets, together with the European countries whose 
trades are more closely connected to Germany (Table 8). In the case 
of Spain, data allow us to split the increase only for the period 2007-
2011 (which is the period shown in Table 9). However, for the entire 
aggregate we have data available up to 2013 showing an increase in 
the export/GDP ratio of 7,4 points in the period 1999-2013, implying 
a further acceleration of exports in 2012-2013. In fact, this is what 
aggregate data for Spain’s exports confirm, while the previous 
analysis suggested that exports to Germany were a major driver. 
 
Table 9 
Country 
Exports of goods and services - % GDP of each country 
Total To EU countries Extra-EU 
1999 2007 2013 1999 2007 2013 1999 2007 2013
Germany 29,4 47,2 50,7 18,7 29,8 28,8 10,7 17,4 21,9
Spain (2011)  26,7 26,9 30,8 19,5 19,5 20,9 7,1 7,4 9,9 
France 26,3 26,9 27,2 16,6 16,9 15,8 9,7 10,0 11,4
Italy 24,3 28,9 30,4 14,9 17,4 16,1 9,4 11,5 14,3
  2013-1999 2013-1999 2013-1999 
Germany 21,3 10,1 11,2 
Spain (2011)  4,1 1,4 2,8 
France 0,9 -0,8 1,7 
Italy 6,1 1,2 4,9 
  2013--2007 2013-2007 2013-2007 
Germany 3,5 -1,0 4,5 
Spain (2011)  3,9 1,4 2,5 
France 0,3 -1,1 1,4 
Italy 1,5 -1,3 2,8 
N.B Our calculations on Eurostat data (ESA05): Spain until 2011.  
The unfavourable consequence of this process is a slowdown of 
economic convergence with the other major countries, such as 
France, Spain and Italy, hampering the process towards an effective 
currency area. Exports improvement, such as for Spain, seems 
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promising, with a volume growth of +15% from 2010 to 2013, which 
is higher than in Germany (+12%), France or Italy (+9%). Moreover, 
between 2007 and 2013 Spain’s exports were the most dynamic, and 
the ratio of export/GDP increased by 7,2 points. However, the 
positive performance of the exports was not enough to balance the 
slump in household consumption; as a consequence, the GDP fell in 
2012 and 2013. 
As we show (Figure C.11), a positive relationship holds between 
GDP and export changes for a cross-section of the EU countries from 
2000 to 2013. A similar correlation holds, over the same period, 
between the changes in final consumption and exports for the EU. 
These results are especially relevant for the countries in the first 
quadrant, (positive changes of consumption and exports), which 
include Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, while for Germany’s other 
partners, such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, only a 
slight decrease in consumption occurred.  
We explain the positive increase of consumption for these 
countries with the spillover of the high added value of Germany in 
the value chain of its exports. As in the Balassa-Samuelson model, 
the most profitable industries will trickle down as higher wages and 
profits to the entire economic area involved.  

5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to unbundle the unbalanced Great 
European Recession, which halted the process of economic 
convergence and divided European countries. We selected the 
following set of economic imbalances: employment, unemployment, 
consumption, investment, current account, and inflation, of which 
only two – unemployment and current account balance – are 
included in the 11 Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure Scoreboard. 
For each imbalance, we estimated a regression on quarterly data, 
from 1999q1 to 2013q4, for Germany, France, Spain and Italy, which 
account for almost 80% of the Euro Zone GDP.  
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Our estimates confirm the chain of causation we posit, from the 
consumption slump – caused by the fiscal policy – to the investment 
drop and to the main consequences, identified with increasing 
unemployment, decreasing employment, falling inflation, current 
account improvement due to increasing unemployment in Italy and 
Spain.  
The estimates show that the first crisis, in 2008, and the second 
crisis, in 2012-2013, caused structural breaks. Italy and Spain went 
through a prolonged economic crisis of 7 years, which changed the 
main economic relationship and returned economic activity to the 
past. In 2014, the real GDP in Italy returned to 1999 levels, while in 
Spain, which reported positive growth in 2014, the real GDP is still 
at the 2005 level. 
We put the imbalances of unemployment and employment, for 
which we estimate a significant relationship with investments and 
exports, at the centre of our analysis. Exports are a crucial driver, in 
the short run, for lower unemployment and higher employment. 
However, exports are exogenous, and it is crucial to implement a 
public investment program with the purpose of promoting private 
investments and employment to jump start the chain reaction of 
increasing disposable income and consumption.  
Investments create employment and are carriers of technological 
innovation, productivity and a better standard of living. Therefore, 
filling the “investment gap” should be the fundamental goal of the 
European economy. 
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Table A.1 Stylized Facts 
Individual Consumption 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 - 60 observations  
Billions Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 231,5 23,4 164,2 245,6 
SPAIN 133,7 21,9 89,1 163,5 
FRANCE 250,4 34,4 185,7 303,1 
GERMANY 336,7 31,9 278,7 406,6 
Total Investment 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 - 60 observations 
Billions Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 70,3 6,0 57,8 79,6 
SPAIN 58,5 8,9 45,6 75,8 
FRANCE 82,8 6,6 68,1 94,8 
GERMANY 103,0 5,6 93,4 112,4 
Total Employment - 60 observations 
period: 1999q1 2013q4  
Millions Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 22,0 0,7 20,0 23,1 
SPAIN 17,8 1,7 14,2 20,6 
FRANCE 24,7 0,9 22,4 25,9 
GERMANY 37,0 1,4 35 39,7 
Total Export 
period: 1999q1 2013q4- 60 obervations  
Billions Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 93,7 9,3 74,0 109,4 
SPAIN 60,5 9,0 43,1 78,1 
FRANCE 113,7 11,0 87,2 132,6 
GERMANY 243,4 57,7 139,4 334,4 
Unemployment rate 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 - 60 obervations  
Rates Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 8,6 1,6 5,9 12,5 
SPAIN 14,4 5,8 8,0 26,3 
FRANCE 8,9 0,8 7,1 10,8 
GERMANY 8,1 1,7 5,2 11,4 
Follow next page
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Current Account 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 - 60 obervations 
% GDP Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY -0,9 1,7 -5,9 2,6 
SPAIN -4,8 3,1 -11,8 1,8 
FRANCE -0,1 1,6 -3,3 3,7 
GERMANY 4,3 3,3 -3,3 9,0 
Inflation 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 -  60 obervations  
Rates Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
ITALY 2,2 0,7 0,1 4,0 
SPAIN 2,7 1,1 -0,9 4,9 
FRANCE 1,7 0,8 -0,4 3,7 
GERMANY 1,6 0,7 -0,4 3,2 
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Table A.2. Improving and Losing Countries (2013-2010) 
  GDP - volumes 
2013-2010 % 2013/2010
  2010 2011 2012 2013 
Italy 1.418.376 1.424.752 1.391.018 1.365.227 -53.149 -3,7 
Greece 193.754 179.986 167.436 160.981 -32.772 -16,9 
Spain 948.244 948.721 933.148 921.739 -26.505 -2,8 
Portugal 158.544 156.561 151.504 149.374 -9.170 -5,8 
Netherlands 549.265 554.453 547.538 543.033 -6.232 -1,1 
Croatia 36.875 36.788 35.982 35.654 -1.221 -3,3 
Cyprus 15.327 15.394 15.023 14.210 -1.117 -7,3 
Slovenia 31.347 31.569 30.767 30.426 -921 -2,9 
Czech Rep. 119.442 121.614 120.372 119.248 -194 -0,2 
LOSING 3.471.173 3.469.839 3.392.788 3.339.891 -131.281 -3,8 
  GDP - volumes 
2013-2010 % 2013/2010
  2010 2011 2012 2013 
Malta 5.542 5.619 5.680 5.843 302 5,4 
Finland 164.164 168.802 167.100 164.795 631 0,4 
Hungary 87.760 89.138 87.655 88.618 859 1,0 
Bulgaria 26.570 27.059 27.218 27.452 882 3,3 
  GDP - volumes 
2013-2010 % 2013/2010
  2010 2011 2012 2013 
Luxembourg 32.725 33.348 33.289 34.001 1.276 3,9 
Estonia 11.258 12.234 12.786 13.073 1.815 16,1 
Latvia 12.463 13.125 13.809 14.377 1.914 15,4 
Denmark 206.676 208.891 208.141 209.009 2.333 1,1 
Slovakia 48.372 49.815 50.712 51.189 2.818 5,8 
Lithuania 22.099 23.436 24.293 25.103 3.004 13,6 
Ireland 163.483 167.029 167.291 166.723 3.240 2,0 
Belgium 321.956 327.604 327.133 327.776 5.820 1,8 
Romania 90.735 92.848 93.364 96.655 5.921 6,5 
Austria 261.782 269.201 271.545 272.411 10.629 4,1 
Sweden 323.348 332.830 335.919 341.419 18.072 5,6 
Poland 307.696 321.607 328.018 333.111 25.415 8,3 
France 1.772.645 1.808.575 1.808.826 1.812.687 40.042 2,3 
U.K. 1.898.237 1.919.448 1.924.779 1.958.337 60.100 3,2 
Germany 2.375.659 2.454.848 2.471.753 2.482.430 106.771 4,5 
IMPROVING 8.133.169 8.325.454 8.359.312 8.425.011 291.842 3,6 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database 
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Table B.1 
Employment impact of 10% increase of fixed investment on domestic demand  
(Italy-2013) 
Nace Sectors Employment % total 
A Agricolture, hunting and forestry 3.361 1,0 
B Fishing 54 0,0 
C Mining and quarrying 541 0,2 
D Manufacturing 68.116 19,9 
E Electricity, gas and water supply 1.929 0,6 
F Construction 141.263 41,3 
G Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor 42.713 12,5 
H Hotel and restaurants 4.500 1,3 
I Transport, storage and communication 28.223 8,2 
Nace Sectors Employment % total 
J Financial intermediation 6.081 1,8 
K Real estate, renting and business activity 39.640 11,6 
L Public Administration 188 0,1 
M Education 1.380 0,4 
N Heatlth and social work 146 0,0 
O Other community, social and personal services 3.738 1,1 
P Private Households 567 0,2 
Q Extra-territorial services 1 0,0 
342.442 100,0 
Source: calculation by Lorenzo Toffoli on input-output table 2010 
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Table B.2 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
log( unemployment rate) = 0 + 1*log(total investment) + 2*log(export) 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN (1) FRANCE (1) GERMANY 
Total investment -2,539 -1,181 -1,330 -8,316 
(-9,39) (-3,03) (-4,22) T (-4,07) 
Export -0,240 -1,311 
(-1,04) (-3,53) 
C 33,237 15,551 -17,051 114,296 
Lags 2* 2* 1* 1** 
White Test prob 0,0021 0,000 0,1945 0,0842 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 6,07 0,29 3,19 5,19 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 15,65 6,50 9,21 6,36 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T: trend added 
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Table B.3 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
log(Individual consumption) = 0 + 1*log(disposable income) 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Cointegration equation 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Disp.Income 
0,684 1,078 0,966 0,941 
(4,95) (34,55) (78,25) (87,98) 
C 3,768 -1,065 0,255 0,577 
apc 0,853 0,879 0,848 0,837 
mpc 0,58 0,95 0,82 0,79 
Lags 2* 2* 2* 2* 
White Test prob 0,2252 0,0272 0,7486 0,1552 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 34,93 20,24 25,07 122,19 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 19,99 15,40 15,04 54,86 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
* Cointegration is significant at 5% or less 
** Cointegration is significant between 5% and 10% 
T: trend added 
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Table B.4 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Italy 
log(Individual consumption) = 0 + 1*log(disposable income) +  
2*log(net financial assets)+ 3*bonds10years + 4*log(collective consumption) 
Cointegrated equation 
Variable BdI BdI Estimate 
Table 2 (F) Table II-1 (D) 2013 
Housing wealth 0,047 0,064 
(3,879) (5,601) 
Financial wealth/ non housing wealth 0,191 0,244 0,142 
(8,463) (10,974) (1,486) 
Disposable income 0,755 0,444 0,664 
(9,008) (10,930) (3,461) 
Bonds10/ interest rate -0,045 -0,019 0,052 
(-6,162) (-3,024) (6,131) 
Collective consumption -0,191 0,312 
(-4,181) (2,939) 
Banca d'Italia, “Household wealth in Italy”, A. Bassanetti and F. Zollino, 2007 
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Table B.5 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
log(Individual consumption) = 0 + 1*log(disposable incomet-1) +  
2*log(net financial assetst-1)+ 3*(interest ratet-1) + 4*d(log(saving ratet-1)) 
period: 1999q1 2013q4 
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Disp.Incomet-1 0,507 0,816 0,507 0,758 
(7,61) T (35,63) (6,97) T (3,48) 
Fin.Assetst-1 0,128 0,246 0,130 0,036 
(2,72) T (6,64) (3,15) T (0,40) 
Bonds 10 yearst-1 0,0003 0,006 0,005 -0,008 
(0,10) T (1,25) (1,03) T (-1,18) 
% Saving ratet-1 -0,049 -0,016 -0,091 -0,052 
(-7,64) T (-6,14) (-9,39) T (-2,38) 
C 3,967 -1,302 4,029 2,435 
(5,85) (-3,01) (3,82) (1,43) 
Break 
criteria sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
 
2010Q3/2007
Q2 2007Q4 2008Q4 no break 
 
2007Q2/2010
Q2    
White Test prob 0,025 0,792 0,007 0,004 
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey prob 0,013 0,914 0,055 0,905 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 0,87 0,00 0,07 28,59 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 12,85 4,49 13,93 42,55 
t statistic in parenthesis 
T: time trend 
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Table B.6 
Inflationt= 0 + 1inflationt-1 + 2 inflationt-2 + 3*d(log(individual consumption)) +  
4*d(log(oil price)) + 5*d(log(unemployment rate))      
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
period: 1999q1 2013q4  
Variable\Country ITALY SPAIN FRANCE GERMANY 
Inflationt-1 0,884 0,879 0,909 0,742 
(6,72) (7,12) (7,80) (6,14) 
Inflationt-2 -0,063 -0,246 -0,225 -0,016 
(-0,47) (-2,35) (-2,18) (-0,15) 
Real 
consumption 
(yoy) 
0,077 0,076 0,081 0,107 
(3,63) (3,97) (3,69) (3,16) 
Oil Price (€) 0,973 1,899 1,355 1,441 
(2,34) (3,14) (3,57) (4,05) 
Unemployment 
(yoy) 
.. .. .. -0,765 
(-1,40) 
C 0,013 0,451 0,171 0,030 
(0,06) (2,07) (1,13) (0,18) 
White Test prob 0,908 0,322 0,028 0,524 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 0,305 0,955 0,739 0,019 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 3,545 0,529 0,904 0,582 
Break 
criteria 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
sequential / 
repartition 
2007Q4 2007Q4 2004Q4 no break 
White Test prob 0,680 0,890 0,680 0,524 
LM (F-Stat) 1° 0,867 1,098 0,397 0,019 
LM (F-Stat) 4° 3,047 1,269 0,249 0,582 
t statistic in parenthesis 
T: a time trend is added for stationarity 
 
  
66 
Figure C.1 

Source: calculations by Maurizio Baussola 

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Figure C.2 

Source: calculations by Maurizio Baussola 

Figure C. 3 

Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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Figure C. 4 

Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
 
Figure C.5 

Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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Figure C.6 

Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
 
Figure C.7 

Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
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Figure C.8 

Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  
 
Figure C.9 
 
Source: our calculation on Eurostat database. Tax covered are: VAT, other 
consumption taxes, car registration, insurance premiums, other taxes on hotels and 
restaurants 
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Figure C. 10 

Source: Source: our calculation on World Bank database 
 
Figure C.11 

Source: our calculation on Eurostat database  

 
(
(

(
(
(
(
(
%
 G
D
P
Exports/GDP (%)
BCDEFG<
OFHFG
PGIMCQ	MFMCR
STIGF
UVDCFCH(
W
WB
SXYU
Y

L
Z
	
J
LS[
Z\
Z
ZP
]P
^
_Z
`
Z


	L
	U
JL
	
PU
>
(
>(
>(
>(
(
(
(
(

(
>( ( ( 
( ( ( (
GD
P 
-C
ha
ng
e 
%
 2
01
0-
20
13
Exports - Change % 2010-2013 
GDP and Exports UE(27) countries
Change % 2010-2013
72 
LEGEND 
    
Inflation  
(infl) 
Quarterly (three months average) data, annual rate of 
change (yoy) Eurostat, Extracted 01.07.14 
Private 
Consumption  
(cind) 
Individual Consumption Expenditures (millions euro), 
Households, European Sector Accounts, Quarterly 
data, Not seasonally adjusted, Eurostat, Extracted 
07.14  
Oil Price Crude Oil Prices: Brent-Europe, Euro per barrel, Not seasonally adjusted, Fred St. Louis, Extracted 10.09.14 
Unemployment 
Rate  
(un) 
Unemployment Rate by sex and age groups, Quarterly 
average, %, Seasonally adjusted data, Eurostat, 
Extracted 07.14 
Savings Rate 
(savrat) 
Saving Rate in %, Households, European Sector 
Accounts, Quarterly data, Not seasonally adjusted, 
Eurostat, Extracted 07.14 
Total Investment 
(SA) 
(invtot) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 6 asset type, 
Volumes, Total fixed assets, Million Euro, chain-linked 
volumes reference year 2005, Seasonally adjusted and 
adjusted data by working days, Quarterly data, 
Eurostat, Extracted 05.09.14 
Construction 
Investment  
(ctr) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 6 asset type, 
Volumes, Dwellings + Other buildings and structures, 
Million Euro, chain-linked volumes reference year 
2005, Seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by 
working days, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 
05.09.14 
Industrial 
Investment  
(ind) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 6 asset type, 
Volumes, Total fixed assets - construction investment, 
Million Euro, chain-linked volumes reference year 
2005, Seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by 
working days, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 
05.09.14 
Export 
(ex) 
GDP and main components, Volumes, Exports of 
goods and services, Million Euro, chain-linked 
volumes reference year 2005, Seasonally adjusted and 
adjusted data by working days, Quarterly data, 
Eurostat, Extracted 08.09.14 
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Total Investment 
(NOT SA) 
(invtns) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 6 asset type, 
Volumes, Total fixed assets, Million Euro, chain-linked 
volumes reference year 2005, Not seasonally adjusted, 
Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 05.09.14 
Total Investment    
(Germany/France/S
pain/Italy) 
GDP and main components, Current Price, Gross fixed 
capital formation, Million Euro, not seasonally 
adjusted data, Eurostat, ESA2005 
Public Investment 
(publ) 
Quarterly non-financial accounts for general 
government, Gross Capital Formation, Million Euro, 
not seasonally adjusted data, Eurostat, Extracted 
14.10.14 
Private Investment 
(priv) Total Investment - Public Investment 
Pil 
GDP and main components, Volumes, Gross Domestic 
Product at market prices, Million Euro, chain-linked 
volumes reference year 2005, Seasonally adjusted and 
adjusted data by working days, Quarterly data, 
Eurostat, Extracted 09.11.14 
Current Account 
(ca) 
Main Balance of Payments and International 
Investment position items as share of GDP, Quarterly 
data, Percentage of GDP, Eurostat, Extracted 08.09.14 
Total Employment   
(em_tot) 
Employment by sex, age and economic activity, Total 
activities, Quarterly data, Eurostat, Extracted 22.10.14 
Industrial 
Employment 
(em_ind) 
Employment by sex, age and economic activity, 
Manufacturing, electricity, gas, water, Quarterly data, 
Eurostat, Extracted 22.10.14 
Dwellings 
Employment       
(em_dwe) 
Employment by sex, age and economic activity, 
Construction activities, Quarterly data, Eurostat, 
Extracted 22.10.14 
Disposable Income  
(gdi) 
Gross Disposable Income (adj. D8) (millions euro), 
Households, European Sector Accounts, Quarterly 
data, Eurostat, Extracted 07.14 
Financial Assets 
(finass) 
Net Financial Assets (Million Euro), Households, 
European Sector Accounts, Quarterly data, Eurostat, 
Extracted 07.14 
Bond 10 years Bonds 10 years, Quarterly data, percent, Not Seasonally adjusted, OECD, Extracted 10.14 
74 
Bond 3 months Bonds 3 months, Quarterly data, percent, Not Seasonally adjusted, OECD, Extracted 10.14 
Profit 
(prof) 
Gross Operating Surplus + Gross Mixed Income 
(Million Euro), Non-financial corporations key ratios 
and components, European Sector Accounts, Quarterly 
data, Not Seasonally adjusted, Eurostat, Extracted 
07.14  
NB Profits of non-financial corporation are missing for 
Germany: as a proxy we use Gross operating surplus 
and gross mixed income as defined by National 
Account (S_ADJ) 
Consumption 
(cind2) 
GDP and main components, Volumes, Final 
Consumption expenditure of households, Million Euro, 
chain-linked volumes reference year 2005, Seasonally 
adjusted and adjusted data by working days, Quarterly 
data, Eurostat, Extracted 09.11.14 
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